Communal Governance: Societal Unity in Diversity
This essay challenges two commonly held views regarding governance: First, sovereignty and writ of state must be uniformly applied within a nation; second, that national identity must be founded on identifiable motifs of culture, language or ethnicity.
Starting with the premise that the problems of governance in Pakistan stem from the need to adapt to modern times, one may see that our traditional economy and sociology should be used for communal/local governance while modern governance structures can be used at the provincial and National level. Building on this premise, this essay makes a case for communal/local government empowerment that can maintain a necessary modicum of national unity to match modern demands while retaining diversity of communities and ethnic identities at the grass root level. Here lies the smallest scale of traditional cultural entities in all ecologies across the administrative divide. Such cultural entities are the main concern of the commons. In a sense this essay is a summation of the issues I have addressed so far, and their possible solutions.
National Identity – Local Culture, Language, Ethnicity:
It is impossible that the national identity of Pakistan could be constructed on linguistic or ethnic grounds. The only common cultural denominator that can be applied to the nation is Islam, since it is the dominant religion in all our administrative entities. However, pockets of other religions form a demographic majority in some villages, union-councils or tehsils. Distribution of Muslim sects also creates pockets of geography, some of which are almost exclusively inhabited by minor sects. Even the dominant sect [Sunni Muslims], lacks consensus and, at times, exhibits violent disagreements about the principles of governance. Though Islam provides an umbrella under which the nation can be united, a consensus regarding the rights of minorities, belonging to other religions and Muslim sects, is needed. Ecological unity in diversity, however, provides a vital geographic underpinning for the integration of the country.
The more nebulous aspect of this unity in diversity is the ethnic fabric and the unity of cultural that may be found in the social attitude of Pakistanis. Community formation, information sharing and the accumulation of social capital in the form of mutual interest references are the hallmark of Pakistanis.
The will to acquire skills and excellence is generally under developed in the average Pakistani due to the absence of desire to dominate. Having made an important contribution in a specific field, most Pakistanis settle for a ‘make do’ level of refinement in it, leaving it to others to capitalize on it. In their interface with state: Pakistanis will generally avoid interacting with it unless it becomes inevitable. If forced to deal with the state mechanism, they are more likely to deal with the official rather than the institution. In the matter of religion, Pakistanis tend try to find a mentor and, as with state, try to deal with the individual or the ritual of faith rather than the institution. In the social sphere the choice is made as a communal decision.
Four characteristics of Pakistanis appear to be influential in inhibiting functions of modern governance. In apportioning governance spaces and delimiting jurisdiction of state institutions in Pakistan at both levels: a) vertically [as levels of administration] and b) horizontally [ that is between departments within a level].
- Communal territoriality & administrative disconnects. Pakistani communities are very possessive about their jurisdiction within their locality. Because of this, a constant struggle with the administration is the norm. This implies that state institutions often work without local support, causing administrative failure.
- The ‘Make do’, sometimes becomes ‘make shift’; but is seldom raised to a level of neatness that is within the potential of inputs and systemic structures – our dilemma is: when is “good enough” actually capable of serving us on a national scale. This leads to the casual behaviour of government employees in following procedures laid out in “the book”; and the laxity of citizens, who observing laws only partially.
- The Value structures and communal courtesies/discourtesies: public transport which blocks roads; the hawkers, push carts, and shops intruding on footpaths or parts of a road, householders who use their street or adjacent roads for domestic functions. Are these Pakistani courtesies to each other or discourtesies? The answer seems to be: both! If you do not know what I mean, other essays of mine may illustrate this.
- Individual/personal initiatives and extra-legal alternate solutions to the failure of governance like driving on the wrong side of the road due to absence of service lanes, underpasses or appropriate ‘u-turns’; enforcing or ensuring adequate supply of gas/electricity by tapping main utility lines due to cumbersome procedures, demand of graft, inefficiency or malafide intent of officials. These encourage a hawker or shop keeper to break road barriers when the vendor’s cart or trade lie across the road from his home.
Each of these four is in itself capable of, and often responsible for, destruction of public property and the apathy of society to support the activities of the government. They stem from a government’s insensitivity to communal needs when taking decisions. Though it may have been enough for development initiatives in the west to induce or bribe people by paying compensation after forcing them to accept the “need for progress”, here, in Pakistan, the same money could be needed as a kickback to a government official.
If the community is able to choose from the variety of social services that provinces or districts are able to offer, it is likely that the infrastructure provided will be utilized to its full potential and be safeguarded by the community as its beneficiary. If a regulatory policy is initiated by some commercial community, like shop keepers, transporters, or mill owners, it is seldom violated. This is because Pakistanis are still deterred by communal boycott or isolation. Governments which resorted to negotiations with a communal leadership have generally recorded greater success than those who have attempted to bribe the trade union leader or tribal elder; since those people then continuously tend to blackmail the government.
Three aspects of Pakistani socio-cultural life, however, which cannot be dealt with so easily. This does not imply that local and communal institutions are not viable for dealing with them. The three issues are:
- Linguistic
The communal right to linguistic territoriality was a major issue between the Bengalis in East Pakistan and Muhajirs in West Pakistan that created the atmosphere of mistrust and introduced a sense of deprivation which was not addressed because of the modern view that linguistic unity is imperative in a nation. In the Pakistan of today, West Pakistan of that time, there was less chance of any regional language to compete with Urdu due to the variety of languages. However, a festering disenfranchisement/disempowerment has continued to exist in circles where linguistic pride, or cultural space guarded by an ethnicity, is at stake.
Ironically, Urdu, touted as the unifying factor of Muslims during the freedom movement, the one which elicited such a violent sense of dismay among Bengalis, is the one which has paid the heaviest price. Urdu has lost its potential for dominance as it cannot compete with English on the national front or international forums; yet it is blamed for the failure of political and administrative support to local languages. This is because the space which is needed for local languages is education and literature and it is the same space that is claimed by Urdu in the name of national unity/integration. While the state has attempted to provide national forums to both, these forums have been unable to serve either lobby adequately.
If the state were to invest in developing a curriculum based on local languages up to the primary level in provinces [where diversity is mainly in dialects] to prepare a syllabus that can lead to use of the common script in a way that lets students transit to the national language [Urdu] at the secondary level, the linguistic antagonism may be converted into cooperation and affinity. This should lead to a sense of empowerment for all factions in the current contest for social-linguistic space and increase national integration.
2. Religious
As in case of language, so in case of religion, executive elites entrusted with governance by the vigilantes [civil society] of the global village are the modernists, our ‘national civil society’. Though divided within itself by sharp fissures of social stratification [such as the supporters of English language] they are united in opposition to the elite which supports religion as a unifying factor in Pakistani society. They are also agreed that those who do not subscribe to their view are misguided or intellectually not equipped.
As in the case of language, the non-secular factions are also competing for religious space/spiritual niche. Thus they, often more antagonistic and almost always more intolerant of each other than of the secular community. Although religious people may be more in number and can be more active in commitment and tenacity to their cause than secular and modern people; but they are often less effective due to conflict of interest in the desired end-result; consequently they never gain executive control or the power of the state.
It is unlikely that an arbiter of governance from the bureaucracy, judiciary or academic intelligentsia will be willing to resolve differences between religious leaders. However, it does become necessary for both sides to seek some kind of ‘secular’ platform that can accommodate all those who have a hold over a segment of society. This solution has to lie at a relatively neutral position within the national-religious mosaic.
In contrast with the linguistic solution, it is virtually impossible to develop a consensus of beliefs at the higher [or more erudite level of understanding] of religions and sects. Here the solution must lie in the consensus at a lower level: the minimal space [lowest common denominator of values] and the maximum [highest common multiple] level of tolerance that can be exercised under the classification of ‘Muslim’ can provide the key for locating an index for communal tolerance that can be extended across the board.
3. Ethnicities, regionalism and lifestyles
The ethnic fabric is in one sense Pakistan’s greatest asset. In another sense it causes all conceivable socio-political problems that impedes our progress. Whereas the delimitation of ethnic watersheds is invariably problematical, there is a safety net of race or language that cordons off peripheral identities. In Pakistan small ecological units can even limit communication between dialects. At the same time, the distribution of races or tribes throughout the country force us to use a definition of ethnicity which can allow us to identify one demography as an ethnicity on the basis of a shared locality and another based on genetic/racial ties.
The classification of languages in Pakistan according to the provincial structure [used by its colonial masters] is as convenient for marking out large regions as any administrative arrangement we may think of. Pakistanis use them as loosely marked ethnic zones but the categorization is fragile. Urban occupations & elites cut across provinces, thus realigning social loyalties according to lifestyles. This problem is not unique to Pakistan; it is in fact a natural outcome of cosmopolitan life and was common in pre-modern times also. What is unique is that in Pakistan, even when two communities seem totally disconnected, the linguistic, cultural and racial remain operative. Thus bonds based on occupation and lifestyle are added on. Both aspects possess integrating commonalities at times and disintegrating varieties at others.