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THE CONCEPT OF SULTAN AND MUSLIM POLITICAL THEORIES

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The Muslim political theory or attitude to politics has evolved over centuries adapting itself to the requirements of time and space. In this context it is relevant to state that the Khilafat gradually changed in nature as the environment and situation demanded.

With the decline in power of the Abbasid Khilafat, independent and semi-independent governments began to come into existence in the periphery of the Abbasid domain. These were the Sultanates¹. As the Sultanates developed, guide books for the political behavior of the Sultans began to appear. It is from the works which contain the guiding principles for the Sultanate that we derive the political theories which applied to them². Some of the topics discussed in those works would appear today under the title of administration or management rather than in a treatise on political science but most issues dealt within them are still discussed under political theories. These works have a holistic approach to government and as such do not distinguish between administration and politics, an approach which was consonant with the political system of the Muslims at that time.

The authors of these works had two main objectives: In the first place they had to rationalize the presence of the Sultan without negating either the Khilafat³ or the principles of Islamic polity. In the second they had to give a model for the Sultan to follow.

I, RATIONALE OF THE EMERGENT SULTANATES, Given BY MUSLIM THEORISTS:

There was no place for the Sultanate in Islamic political theory, therefore a place had to be found. This place was created with the help of Sassanid and Turkish tradition. Al-Ghazzali, in particular, relied heavily on accounts of pre-Islamic Iranian

rulers to personify the Sultan⁴. His concept of Sultan is somewhat similar to the Iranian concept of Shah⁵. Nizam-i-Arudi also quotes examples of Kayani, Pishdadi and Sassani Shahs³. This trend towards Iranian institutions could perhaps be linked with the resurgence of Persian language and literature as pointed out by R.N.Frye⁶. The process went by stages from tolerance of Persian language to its dominance. That the common reader was better able to follow Persian texts by the 13th century is obvious from the fact that writers needed to add Persian translations when they used Arabic proverbs in Persian text⁷.

The Sultanate came into being when the Khilafat was still a living institution although its power⁸ was on the decline. Al-Mawardi⁹ was perhaps the first theologian to attempt a rationalization of the modified position of the Khilafat. Living in anomalous times he needed to justify both the Buwayhid power and the Khalifah's control. He therefore identified three kinds of control under the Khilafat. This was perhaps his greatest contribution: the rationalization of the fate accompli¹¹.

Al-Mawardi's Imam is either elected or nominated. The ratification of the position of an Amir who usurped power being construed as a nomination. Other conditions such as the election of a less qualified person in the presence of a more qualified one are also meant to rationalize the Buwayhid practices and norms. The Imam is permitted to act without consulting the people who are required to entrust their affairs to him. However, the Imam is bound to safeguard and defend the established principles of religion as propounded by the authorities on the subject. He must dispense justice, maintain law and order for prosperity and security of the people, defend the frontiers, organize Jihad, collect Kharaj and Zakat, fix allowances for those entitled, appoint honest and sincere people to offices and should keep himself personally informed of the state of affairs without entrusting his own functions to others or engrossing himself in luxury or religious devotion. The Imam may be deposed if he suffers a loss of moral or physical abilities required for government¹².

The most important works on the statecraft of the Sultanate were written by Tusi and Al-Ghazzali¹³. These works formulated

the various aspects of Sultanate and, to an extent, determined the code of behavior that was followed in all Sultanates.

The Abbasids had apparently given greater importance to the institutions and had used bait along with hereditary succession¹⁴. However, prominent members of the civil and military administration retained the right to depose the ruler. The reaction against the Mutazila and ascendancy of the Turks occurred almost simultaneously c.850 AD¹⁵. Thereafter, the power of the Khalifah declined gradually till Buwayhid times. None of the Sultans seem to have desired the same hold over the khalifah that the Buwayhids exercised¹⁶. It was in this situation that the Saljuq Sultans developed their political practice and Nizam-ul-Mulk Tusi propounded his theory of Sultanate.

In Tusi's concept of state power and prosperity are deemed divine gifts¹⁷ and the Sultan must remember that he is answerable for the justice he has dispensed and the sovereignty he has exercised, on the Day of Judgment¹⁸. He will be answerable for the harm that has come, to those entrusted to his care, through his carelessness or because he had entrusted his duties to others¹⁹. Other functions of the Sultan outlined by Tusi include: holding court for redress of wrongs, tax collection and the assignment of land as well as the treatment meted out by the assignees to the peasants under their control. The policies and principles described by Tusi are basically ways of ensuring prosperity and justice. The basic difference is in the status and power²⁰ of the Sultan.

Al-Ghazzali needed to ratify the Khilafat due to his orthodox viewpoint and support the Sultanate on pragmatic grounds. He, therefore dissociated them from each other. The Sultan was ascribed the duty of looking after the welfare of the people. The Amir should be obeyed, followed and loved. In his turn the Amir/Sultan is described as one who awards justice. The development and/or the desolation of the universe depends on the behavior and actions of the Sultan²¹.

Muslim philosophers viewed the sultan as the arbitrator between his subjects in their two roles: man as a social

animal and man's tendency to anarchy²². The Sultans generally rose to the dignity of that office through personal ambition but were forced to conform to certain ideals of behavior due to public pressure and expectations based on the opinions expressed by learned theologians. The laws of social interaction and economic matters were dealt with at the local level under similar dictates although they, perhaps, did not respond to changes in government as readily as politics and administration. The Sultan founding a new Sultanate probably had little recourse to the theoretical treatises and probably believed that his prime function as Sultan was to defend his realm.

Initially the Sultanates that emerged from the periphery of the Khilafat were heirs to traditions of the Khilafat itself, the Iranian political concepts and the tribal tradition of the Turks. The theorists amalgamated these traditions in their work²³. The object of government was: to uphold religion (the traditions of the Muslims and the beliefs of Islam) as had been done by the Khalifahs, to administer the Sultanate as the Shahs of ancient Persia had done and to lead the army in the manner in which Turk chiefs did. The advice of the theorists was geared to the effective and convenient achievement of these objectives.

The Investiture.

Amirs who had usurped power had been recognized through the award of investiture and this had become a norm in the system of the Sultanate starting with the Ghaznavis²⁴. By denying the investiture the Khalifah could make the position of the Sultan precarious and induce (or even direct) another contender to aspire for the Sultanate²⁵. Later the Khalifah's power declined further and the Sultanates emerging in distant lands used the investiture merely to ratify their claim or enhance their prestige. A Sultan faced with a contender for his Takht, or a hostile public opinion found the Khalifah's investiture useful in counteracting such opposition²⁶.

The investiture neither increased the Khalifah's control nor decreased the independence of the Sultan. It merely signified the inclusion of the Sultanate in question within the state system of the Muslims. This in fact added to the prestige of the Sultan

and legitimized his power in the eyes of the Muslim subjects. In due course the Khalifah merely remained the custodian of moral sanction: ratifying the Islamic behaviour of the Sultan.

Although investiture ratified the de-facto emergence of the Sultanates and established them politically, they had yet to be rationalized de-jure for which the theorists had to stretch the point to varying degrees. According to al-Mawardi it was mandatory to select an Imam. Those who selected him were also expected to possess certain attributes which made them eligible as selectors (thus forming a special college). Their candidates in turn had to possess the qualities mandatory/essential for an Imam/Amir. In theory franchise (being one of the selectors) was not restricted to the capital but in practical term limits of communication would have made it generally impossible for people who were far away from the seat of the Imam to influence decisions (i.e. in general franchise was limited to the capital for all intents and purposes). Al-Mawardi did not believe in the simultaneous existence of more than one Imam and the nomination of the Imam by his selector(s) had to be ratified by bait.

Nature of the Muslim State:

These views neither allow for a Divine Right nor a Social Contract though elements of both may be identified in them. Tusi suggests that "Divine Decree"²⁷ is involved in the appointment on the Sultan while Al-Ghazzali goes one step further and states that God has assigned Sultans the task of preserving men from the evils they can do to one another²⁸. In addition Al-Ghazzali believes that the Sultans have a separate genealogy from that of the prophets after Adam²⁹.

Initially the Khalifah was Imam in both the religious and temporal sense. No doubt other religious thinkers would be consulted on points of law but the leadership in both fields devolved upon the Khalifah. In later times the Khalifah found that he had to rely heavily on the opinions of the Faqihs to supplement his own limited religious knowledge³⁰. Thus the Faqihs also came to be called Imam. With the growth of Sultanates a third use of the term Imam came into vogue — the Amir as Imam³¹. By Ruzbahan's time the Sultan was as much an

Imam as the Khalifah except that the latter also symbolized the unity of the Muslims and was the most prominent among all such Imams³².

Having rationalized the existence of the Sultan in the Islamic political structure with the help of the Iranian model (dissociating the genealogies of the rulers from those of the prophets)³³, the next step was to define the role of the Sultan and attribute functions to him. This was not merely a futile exercise. The sultans did in fact take these definitions into account³⁴. The recommendations made in these works were used variously for purposes that, in modern terminology, may be referred to as party programmes, manifestos, constitutions, management manuals, or theories of politics, government and administration.

There was neither a Social Contract nor a Divine Theory of Kingship in this System. That a person had managed to become Sultan was Divine Decree, the functions he was expected to perform were according to a Divine Covenant thus the Sultan was in a sense under a Divine Contract³⁵ between the Sultan and God. In case he failed to perform these functions³⁶ his subjects were at liberty to dethrone³⁷ him. Thus the Divine Contract between God, His people, and their ruler³⁸. The Divine Contract was tripartite: the Sultan acquired the ability to rule as a Divine Gift, not a Divine Right, the well-being of his Subjects was a Divine Trust, and the rights of the Subjects against a Sultan who violated the Trust were Divine Sanctions, and God was the supreme arbiter of both, the Trust and the "Sanctions".

Ali Hamadani, in his *Zakhirat-ul-Muluk*, believes in a different status for the Muslim subjects as compared to the non-Muslims³⁹. He emphasizes the role of *Adl-o-Ehsan* and believes that there are dire consequences for rulers who fail to uphold these principles since they (the rulers) are the custodians of the Divine functions.

II: QUALITIES OF A SULTAN.

While the early theorists were less interested in identifying the qualities of a Sultan (perhaps because they felt that the criteria for the Imam could be applied uniformly) later theorists began to emphasize this pragmatic aspect of selection.

Muhammad Bin Ali 40 was of the opinion that intelligence was the most important quality in a Sultan. Ruzbihan considered it mandatory that a competent person should aspire to become the sultan even if he was not called upon to do so by those competent to select a Sultan⁴¹. Almost all the theorists have considered the same qualities essential for an Imam with some variations depending on their own personal views, the milieu of their times and whether they placed a greater degree of emphasis on Iranian, Turk, or Arab norms. The essence of all these views, however, is that the Imam must protect the faith, adjudicate between his subjects, maintain civil liberties, give salaries and stipends regularly and justly, appoint the honest and the reliable as representatives of the state and maintain a balance between piety and luxury in his court as well as in his public and private life⁴².

Kaikaus is more attuned to the tradition of the Turks and consequently more pragmatic⁴³. Thus, perhaps more influenced by Iranian culture felt that the ruler should be of "comely appearance, kindly disposition, integrity, manliness, bravery, horsemanship, knowledge, (skill in) the use of arms and many other arts". In addition, he endorsed the need for compassion, strict adherence to promises and the respect of the righteous and the learned. The Imam should, apart from these functions, do good and provide relief from oppression to his subjects, wherever oppression exists⁴⁴. Al-Ghazzali believes that the divine effulgence manifests itself in the Sultan in the form of sixteen qualities some of which are: intelligence, knowledge, sharpness of mind, ability to perceive things, perfect physique, literary taste, moderation, judgement and foresight⁴⁵. Hamadani stresses only the qualities of justice and the company of the righteous and wise⁴⁶. Ruzbahan's Imam needs to possess twelve qualities: he should be from the tribe of the Quraish, able to make deductions from *Shar*, have a personal opinion, be efficient and knowledgeable in financial matters, courageous, mature, intelligent, a free man, male, and sound of hearing and sight. Ruzbahan then explains the conditions under which an illiterate and non-Quraish may become Imam. The Imam may be selected by the consensus of opinion of the people within the area, by succession, by nomination by a panel, or by force. Such a *Khilafat/Imamat* must be accepted by the people and God is the judge⁴⁷.

Each of the sources deal with two aspects of the Sultan's life: the personal or private habits and the public behaviour.

Despite discrepancies, all theorists are in agreement regarding the basic functions of the Sultan: he must be a practicing Muslim who is responsible for the welfare of his subjects; just as God is the mediator between his executive (Amirs) and the people (riaya). Rulers are sent to save men from the tyranny of other men, therefore they are bound to ensure the "welfare of men's lives"⁴⁸. Thus the Sultan had been rationalized as the head of the state in place of the Khalifah, due to the fragmentation of the Muslim world.

His functions included defending the faith. He was equally bound to take care of the welfare of the people. It was not enough that the Sultan was just, he had to ensure that "his slave troops, servants and officers" were also just⁴⁹. Tusi advocates that a high platform should be set up for the redress of wrongs and for practicing justice as was done by the Iranian Shahs⁵⁰. Al-Ghazzali notes the Arabs saying that the inaccessibility of the ruler is the most damaging thing for both the ruler and the ruled⁵¹. As the Sultan embodies the Divine effulgence so too does he become the symbol of Divine protection. The Sultanate and the Sultan alike were considered extensions of the Divine control over the world.

Functionaries and advisors of the Sultan:

In order to ensure the smooth and efficient functioning of this welfare oriented Muslim state, the theorists advised the business of state should be entrusted to the pious and the good/devout⁵². Alternatively they also used the terms noble and well-born⁵³. The interchangeable use of these terms manifests the simultaneous existence of Iranian and Islamic norms in the political theories: the Islamic ideal of personal character and the Iranian concept of nobility of birth were intermixed and confused, consequently the terms were considered synonymous.

The Sultan was constantly advised to consult the wise and learned. By implication the wise were either pious or well born. To consult them was not mandatory but it was advisable.

The advice given by them was not binding but since they in their own rights, were arbiters of public opinion as well as spokesmen for it, it was not wise to disregard their advice unless the Sultan was prepared, for some reason, to risk the possibly consequent rebellion and dethronement. The Sultan was nonetheless fully responsible for his actions and decisions⁵⁴.

The functions of interest aggregation and interest articulation seem to have been performed mainly by the Ulama who generally represented the most powerful group and reflected its public opinion⁵⁶. Sometimes even the government functionaries were responsible for interest articulation. Being the chief functionary of the Sultan the status of the Wazir and the weightage given to his advice was enhanced:

The king ought in principle to observe three principles in his treatment of the Wazir: (i) not to punish him in haste when vexed with him; (ii) not to covet his wealth when he grows rich; and (iii) not to refuse him a necessary request when he makes one. Similarly, the king ought to grant three facilities to the Wazir: (i) to let him see the king whenever he wishes; (ii) not to listen to talk by slanderers against him; and (iii) not to keep secrets from him⁵⁷.

Simultaneously a great deal of emphasis is laid on the good character and wisdom of the Wazir⁵⁸.

The institution of the Wizarat had gradually crept into the political system of the Abbasid Khilafat and grown in importance. In the Sultanates it took root quickly. Al-Mawardi identified two concepts regarding this institution: the Wizarat-i-Tafwid and the Wizarat-i-Tanfidih⁵⁹. Ruzbahan adapted the institution in the framework of the Sultanate as well as the Imam⁶⁰. Some functions of government soon came to be the sole preserves of the Wazir and, if the situation demanded, in order to preserve dynastic continuity the Wazir-i-Tafwid could take on the functions of the Sultan and manage the affairs of Government⁶¹.

Some passages in the theoretical discourses deal with the relationship of the Sultan/Imam with his Amirs or the power of the Wazir in comparison with that of the Amir⁶² but the bulk of the advice is addressed to the Sultan. This is mainly because the subordinates of the Sultan (such as his Umara) were expected to model their behaviour on that of the Sultan.

III : ISSUES IN STATE AND SOCIETY.

Issues such as rights of franchise did not trouble Muslim theorists nor did they interest themselves in the working of political pressure groups because according to them the objective of all government was to uphold the laws of God and to ensure justice and the well-being of subjects. Man was not the arbiter of the code which governed these matters. On the other hand if we believe that these precepts were in fact put into practice, it seems unlikely that people would have had to fight for rights such as Franchise and Fiscal Policy, vote and representation, because according to these precepts it was the duty of the ruler to ensure that the obedient subjects were "untroubled by hardships", refractory subjects were to be punished only in accordance with the laws and to the extent to which they were culpable. Rulers were expected to perform public works such as building mosques and wells, rehabilitating villages (providing them with schools and hospitals) and building inns on public highways⁶³. The Sultan also had to redress the wrongs done to his subjects by his officers⁶⁴. Officers who held land as Aqta "have no authority except to take from them (the riaya)——and that with courtesy -----the due amount of revenue"⁶⁵.

Once the due revenue had been collected by the assignee, the life and property of the riaya was to remain inviolate and the assignees had no further claim on them because the assignees were "like prefects" over the riaya, the Sultan held the same rights over those lands which had not been assigned to an Amir. Such land was referred to as Khalisah land⁶⁶.

The Sultan was required to maintain a dignified appearance. As the Iranian concept gained ground or when the imperial aspect became prominent in a Sultanate, dignity began to be associated

with pomp. Militant Sultans were generally frugal in expenses related to pomp and pageantry. Whereas few theorists have advocated the exhibition of wealth, some have advised that the Sultan should use the public exchequer to maintain the dignity of the Sultan so that he should not appear to be an ordinary person⁶⁷.

Muslim theorists believe that subjects model their behaviour on the pattern set by their rulers. Thus al-Ghazzali believes that the piety of the people depends on the good character of the ruler⁶⁸. The Sultan is required to be particularly lenient with his subjects in times of trial. In case of natural disasters and calamities as well as times of adversity, the Sultan must provide relief to his subjects⁶⁹.

The entire system of the Muslims rested on the image of the model administrator and the Sultan himself was required to set the pace.

NOTES

1- In the first phase of the decline of the Khilafat there came into being independent "dynasties" (the word dynasty is viewed with suspicion in the present paper, especially when applied with respect to the Turks) in Ajam: The Tahiris (820-72 AD), The Saffaris (863-903), The Samanis (874-999), and the Buwayhis (945-1055). These were followed by the Turko-Iranian empires creating the system which served as the model for all Sultanates. These were the Ghaznavis (999-1040), the Saljuqs (1037-1157) and the Khwarizm Shahs (1157-1231).

2- K. A. Nizami, Some Aspects of Religion and Politics in India During the Thirteenth Century, Aligarh, 1961, p. 38f, although people like "Imam Ibn-i-Taimiyyah...rebelled against the finality" all reinterpretation of religious theories had come to an end. Consequently the political theory that was formulated was rationalized on the basis of the religious theories which had been formulated earlier.

3- R. P. Khosla, Mughul Kingship and Nobility, Allahabad, 1934, p. 157, in due course the Khilafat recognized the Sultans

which strengthened their position in the eyes of their immediate followers.

- 4- Al-Ghazzali, Nasihah-ul-Mulk, tr. F. R. C. Bagley, London, 1962.
- 5- Nizami-i-Arudi, Chahar Maqalah, tr. E. G. Browne, London, 1921.
- 6- R. N. Frye, The Golden age of Persia, New York, 1975, pp. 195-202.
- 7- Fakhr-ud-din Mubarak Shah al-Marvarudi, Tarikh-i-Fakhr-ud-din Mubarak Shah, ed. E. D. Ross, London, 1921.
- 8- M. G. Demobynes, Muslim Institutions, London, 1986, p. 111, says that the "local Sultan remains, by a pure fiction, the representative of the Caliph....."
- 9- Born c. 386 H., first wrote his work (Kital al-Iqna) for the Abbasi Khalifah Al-Qadir but his chief fame rests on his al-Ahkam-us-Sultaniyah. See also Qamarud din Khan, Al-Mawardi's theory of State, Lahore, 1983, pp. 20-22.
- 10- The Amirs with limited powers, those with unlimited powers and those who usurped power. Frye, Op. cit., p. 229, sees this as an attempt to justify the Sultanate along with the Khilafat as opposed to Tusi's attempt to substitute the Sultanate in place of the Khilafat and Al-Ghazzali's authoritative dissociation of temporal power from religious authority.
- 11- I. H. Qureshi, The Administration of the Sultanate of Delhi, Lahore, 1942, p. 25. Perhaps this is why Qamaruddin, Op. Cit., believes that there is nothing speculative about Al-Mawardi.
- 12- For details see al-Mawardi's, Al-Ahkam-us-Sultaniyah, tr., Cairo, 1298 AH, and for an analysis see Qamaruddin, Op. Cit., p. 25ff.
- 13- William T. DeBary, ed., Sources of Indian Tradition, Vol. 1, London, 1958, p. 384, believes that after Al-Ghazzali "the

chief function of Scholastic theology was defensive." while W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Edinburgh, 1962, p. 120, believes that there was a complete rift between the Sufis and the Ulema from then onward.

- 14- Amir Hasan Siddiqui, Caliphate and Kingship in Medieval Persia, Karachi, 1963, p. 23.
- 15- Ibid., p. 35ff. In 861 AD the Turks were first used to kill a Khalifah, a similar incident in 932 made it possible for Amirs to extend their influence within the framework of the Khilafat. A first step in this direction was the acquisition of the title of Amir-ul-Umara who, among other things, began to cojoin his (their) name(s) with the Khalifah in the Khutbah and Sikkah.
- 16- Ibid., p. 160. Despite the fact that the Khalifah's effective hold over the Sultan was the investiture, he suggests that in Tusi's estimate the Sultan was a substitute for the Khalifah within his own domain.
- 17- Nizam-ul-Mulk Tusi, Siyasat Namah, tr., H. Darke, London, 1960, p. 9.
- 18- Ibid., p. 12. _____
- 19- Ibid., p. 13. _____
- 20- Ibid., passim. _____
- 21- al-Ghazzali, op. cit., p. 45ff. _____
- 22- Qureshi, op. cit., p. 40ff. _____
- 23- Nizami-i-Arudi, op. cit., p. 3, like some other sources believes the functions performed by the rulers to be second only to those performed by the prophets. Other sources such as the Tarikh-i-Fakhr-ud-din Mubarakshah, referred to earlier, believe that the functions performed by the Ulama take precedence over those performed by the rulers.

- 24- C. E. Bosworth, The Later Ghaznavids: Splendour and Decay, Edinburgh, 1977, p. 78ff. Siddiqui, *Op. Cit.*, p. 127, believes that Mahmud of Ghaznah recognized al-Qadir as Khalifah only because the latter had the power to grant investiture. It also seems possible that the Sultans of Delhi, in later days did not strike silver coins in their own names till the arrival of the investiture in 626 H. as suggested by Edward Thomas, Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi, London, 1871, p. 46.
- 25- This is what happened with the Khwarizm Shahs against the Saljuqs. For details see Ghulam Rabbani Aziz, A Short History of the Khwarizmshahs, Karachi, 1956.
- 26- K. L. Sirvastava, The Position of the Hindus Under the Delhi Sultanate 1206-1526, Delhi, 1980, and T. W. Arnold, The Caliphate, Karachi, 1965, p. 86, believe that this was true of the investiture obtained by Iltutmish. Qureshi, *op. cit.*, believes that the investiture was an article of faith for the Sunnis in the eastern Sultanates.
- 27- Tusi, *op. cit.*, p. 10 and Qamaruddin, *op. cit.*, p.25ff for al-Mawardi's views.
- 28- al-Ghazzali, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
- 29- Ibid.
- 30- This occurred some time after the first hijra century.
- 31- al-Mawardi uses the word Imam to mean Khalifah in both his capacities (as a religious as well as temporal head) and the other usages of the word are employed only by the later theorists. Ibn Khaldun in his Muqaddamah, tr. Rozenhal, London, 1958, p. 154f, believes the Imam to be synonymous with Khilafat. He says that in later times the title of Sultan was used to denote the performance of the same functions as those ascribed to an Imam, and that numerous claimants arose who disregarded the principles governing the institution. He believes that people were forced to owe allegiance to anybody who seized power. According to him the object of having an Imam is to uphold religious law and act as a substitute on behalf of the Holy

Prophet (SAW) as far as possible. The duties of the Sultan are, thus exactly the same as the Imam.

32- Fadl-ullah Ruzbahan, Suluk-ul-Muluk, tr. prof. M. Aslam, Islamabad, 1974, p. 48ff, "... in reality the affair of Imam is a branch of Fiqh.... and " according to Shari'a, Imam consists in succession of the Prophet (may God send upon him peace and blessings)...." He further enunciates the different qualities that the "Imam" should possess as propounded by different "Imams of theology". The first and last use of the term Imam in the quotation given are in the sense of theologians, the second is specifically for Khalifah and the third for Khalifah, Amir and Sultan alike.

33- See Al-Ghazzali, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

34- who is reputed to have said "I will take this book to be my guide and follow its precepts".

35- Ibn Khaldun, *op. cit.*, p. 116, believes that the Bait was a contract of obedience but Al-Mawardi considers it mandatory for the people to entrust their affairs to a Sultan, whereas it was not mandatory for a Sultan to consult the people, however he was obliged to fulfill the obligations which were due to his status.

36- Al-Ghazzali, *op. cit.*, p. 45, emphasises the Divine Decree of obedience to the ruler but adds that even though sovereignty may endure without faith it cannot endure without justice. The ruler is, therefore, bound to be just if he wishes to retain his status and power.

37- The Sultan may be deposed if he suffers a decline in physical or moral ability which makes him unable to rule as Imam. If he loses his sense of justice, disregards prohibitions, has a tendency towards sensual passion, suffers a loss of eyesight, falls into the hands of an enemy or is overpowered by an advisor (loses the power of decision making) . See Al-Mawardi or Qamaruddin, *op. cit.*, for the conditions in which it is mandatory to rebel and those in which it is voluntary. R. P. Tripathi, Some Aspects of Muslim Administration in India, Allahabad, 1936,

p. 5, also notes the fact that an Imam who failed to observe the law or discharge his duties "ran the risk of forfeiting all claim to obedience".

38- The Sultan/Imam/Amir was expected to aspire to Divine attributes in his behavior, especially while mediating between the Umara and the Reaya as God will mediate between the ruler and the ruled on the day of judgement. The Sultan was expected to protect the people from the possible tyranny of the Umara.

39- Loc. cit., (text), Amritsar, 1905, p. 110ff, gives a list of twenty rights (Huquq) for Muslims and twenty conditions (Sharait) for non-Muslims and clearly states that the ruler's obligations to both are different. This is probably because he is writing with reference to a Sultanate where there was not a majority of Muslims (Kashmir). In this regard his views appear to be similar to Barani who was writing in similar circumstances.

40- C. E. J. Whitting, Al-Fakhri, Karachi, 1977, P. 14.

41- Ruzbihan, op. cit., p. 61f.

42- H. K. Sherwani, Early Muslim Political Thought and Administration, Lahore, 1947, passim.

43- Ibid., p. 115.

44- Tusi, op. cit., p. 10f.

45- Al-Ghazzali, op. cit., p. 74, the entire list is not included here.

46- Hamadani, op. cit., p. 91, claims that God does not want his people to suffer from tyranny, especially from their rulers who are appointed to save mankind from its own tyranny.

47- Ruzbahan, op. cit., p. 48ff.

48- Al-Ghazzali, op. cit., p. 45.

49- Ibid., p. 23.

50- Tusi, op. cit., p. 14.

51- Al-Ghazzali, op. cit., p. 95.

52- Tusi, op. cit., p. 49 and passim.

53- Al-Ghazzali, op. cit., p. 86, he also uses the term pious as synonymous to noble, in the same way as it is used by Tusi, op. cit., p. 179, while relating the story of Jafar Barmaki's appointment. Darke translates it as a king of royal stock should have a noble wazir.

54- Ruzbahan, op. cit., p. 61f, lists the duties of the Sultan: he must protect the faith; settle disputes and enforce his commands; guard the land; establish the legal limits; keep the non-Muslims (invaders) from his kingdom; demand that the enemies of Islam should surrender and if they do not do so, he must fight them; he must give stipends and collect revenues; appoint officers for religious and state administration; and personally supervise the task.

We might add here that Ruzbahan is perhaps the least scrupulous of the theorists referred to here, possibly because he lived in troubled times. He probably considers the Khilafat as an archaic institution and, as a result, his theory is somewhat closer to the political practice of the Delhi Sultanate as compared to the views of other theorists.

55- The terms interest articulation and interest aggregation are derived from the modern concepts of "Comparative Politics". In a sense they are self explanatory. During the process of political manipulation people must express their interests or points of view; this is the simplest meaning of interest articulation. When many people have common interests they are expressed collectively; this is the process of interest aggregation.

56- Tusi, op. cit., p. 96.

57- Al-Ghazzali, op. cit., p. 106f.

58- Ibid., p. 107.

59- al-Mawardi, *op. cit.*, the Wazir-i-Tafwid had the same powers as the Khalifah and needed to possess the same qualities as the latter except being from among the Quresh. There could be more than one such Wazir at a time and even non-muslims were eligible according to Tripathi, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

60- Ruzbahan, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

61- This is probably what Barani felt that Muhammad bin Tughluq should have done at the height of his unpopularity. The Naib-ul-Mulk in the Delhi Sultanate was perhaps another title for this kind of a wazir or functionary.

62- Tusi, *op. cit.*, p. 60, delineates the power of the Aam and Khas Amirs and position with respect to the power of the Wazir. Amir Kaikaus, *Qubus Namah*, tr. Levy London, 1951, p. 215, believes that the economic affluence of the empire is the responsibility of the wazir, Qureshi, *op. cit.*, p. 76ff, adds military functions to this list.

63- Tusi, *op. cit.*, p. 10, Al-Ghazzali, *op. cit.*, p. 55, also expresses similar views and advocates the need for looking after the social welfare of the subjects. The point is emphasised by quoting the example of Naushirvan who eliminated poverty from his realm. On p. 56 he adds "religion depends on monarchy, the monarchy on the army, the army on supplies, the supplies on prosperity and prosperity on justice". Thus the entire structure of state and government rests on justice.

64- Tusi, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-33, gives the detail of such duties along with examples of their implementation. Al-Ghazzali, *op. cit.*, p. 95, quotes Ardushir: "the Sultan who lacks the capacity to reform his aristocracy should know that he will be incapable of reforming the mass of his subjects"

65- *Ibid.*, p. 33f.

66- Tusi, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

67- Ruzbahan, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

68- Al-Ghazzali, *op. cit.*, p. 60, Hamadani, *op. cit.*, p. 2, gives a table of contents. The first seven chapters deal with the personal character of the Sultan and only three deal with his public image. He also believes that a person is guardian over his own character just as a "Sultan watches his people".

69- Al-Ghazzali, *op. cit.*, p. 101, gives examples of famine etc. Tusi, *op. cit.*, p. 143, even considers a disorderly or tumultuous change of rulers to be a celestial accident.