

Formation of Muslim Intellectualism for the dual Governance of Societal Relations in South Asia

By
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Pakistan and I are honoured that I have the privilege of presenting the first paper in this august symposium. I am grateful to both my hosts, the government of Bangladesh and IRCICA, for providing me the opportunity to be in Dacca. I wish I had been able to come here before 1970¹, unfortunately I was only a student then and didn't have occasion to do so – still I am glad that my first trip east of Pakistan is to Bangladesh. It is more exciting for me to be here because this region constitutes the eastern limits of the Sultanate of Delhi², my field of specialization. My friend and colleague of thirty years, Dr. S. Alqama and I often discuss why Muslims are no longer at the helm of intellectual leadership. He believes that the west has arrogated to itself the right of definition; while I contend that by using western terminology, the people of the third world, especially the Muslims, have surrendered rights of conceptual definition to European languages³, particularly English.

I am working on a book which seeks to identify the nature of Muslim intellectualism, enquiry and belief. I hope to address epistemological, physical and metaphysical issues in that study but here I will present societal⁴ manifestation of the phenomenon in South Asia during the Delhi Sultanate. For a transition from general roots of Muslim intellectualism to specifics of societal management in South Asia I take my cue from Turkish triangles in architecture⁵ and perform a hop-skip and jump to arrive at the South Asian experience via Ghazali's segmentalized representation of the societal organism⁶. My presentation aims to show how ethics and pragmatism controlled Muslim enquiry in societal relations and metaphysics in South Asia. As concepts these postulations apply to the entire range of Muslim epistemology, the present study however, is concerned with developments in the administrative and social arena during the Delhi Sultanate alone.

The foundations of Muslim intellectualism naturally rest on an ethical system, as do those of all ideologically driven enquiries and "isms". However, unlike most other religions, its emphasis on social practicability, societal consonance and pragmatism is unique because it looks at the common human being, in the pursuance of an ordinary life, as a potential candidate for heaven. Its tenets therefore, acquire culturally applicable forms for different societies within a prescriptive system for an organic structure. Generally this structure is viewed as a set of organs, where each such organ is itself a segment of the whole. A segmental treatment⁷ is particularly advantageous when the purpose of the enquiry⁸ is its prescriptive applicability. Such a formulation facilitates the identification of a series of actions. Thus the erudite may construct procedure for application of theory and ordinary practitioners may follow the steps of how to do things instead of struggling with the question why they occur. In the matter of belief, the prescriptive formulation of steps, outlining how one may achieve the object of desire, makes it easier to accept abstraction and conceptualization. In the ritualistic [Hindu and Jain] societies of South Asia this was a vital vehicle of thought which became the most powerful tool of the Chishtia Silsila⁹.

The present study focuses primarily on the management of societal relations in the South Asian context during the Sultanate of Delhi. However, in order to understand the impact of earlier developments in Muslim thought in the context of Bharat, a brief analysis¹⁰ of Overt Limitations imposed by Islam and enforced by the Ulema is in order. The fact that the Mutazilla¹¹ culpably transgressed these limits forced a reaction, spearheaded by Imam Ghazali. This reaction significantly enhanced the bifurcation of spiritual leadership which was classified as ulema and mashaikh. The bifurcation may have been counterproductive in some areas of the globe but in Bharat it proved extremely fruitful. Chishti Mashaikh, in particular, were able to exploit the space for covert enquiry of a culture specific nature to great advantage¹². We will present below a sketch of this phenomenon at a conceptual level before proceeding to a description of the experience in the Sultanate of Delhi.

OVERT LIMITATIONS AND COVERT EXPLORATIONS:

The belief system of Islam placed certain overt limitations for exercise of human enquiry. These took the form of sharia and its applicative structures in the shape of Fiqh. Concepts such as Jabr & Qadr, Khair & Shar, Kufr & Shirq and Adl & Ehsan circumscribed beliefs while enquiry launched into physics and metaphysics. Physics and metaphysics were both considered to be segments of the organic existence of the world. Each of them, in their independent and separate forms, also constituted organic structures. For example, societal existence had spiritual and temporal aspects so interwoven that it deserved a governance mechanism with an integrated routine of behaviour. Here we can refrain from discussion of other manifestations of integrated Muslim intellectualism as they are not germane to a study of South Asia in the present context. However, organic segments of Spiritual State and Temporal Government at Delhi will form the core of this paper.

The ulema had put an end to the overt sacrilege of the Mutazilla but had been unable to ban covert enquiry into issues of jabr and qadr or khair and shar. These issues reemerged in Sufi doctrine first in the conceptual guise of wahdat-ul-wujud and some centuries later in that of wahdat-ush-shuhud. Need for tangible examples took the form of the Prophet's proxy and came to be identified with the sheikh or murshid. Sirat and sharia were recast in the mould of tariqat under the umbrella of Tasawuf and the doctrines of the sufia. The khanqahs took the mantel of mosques as places of congregation and virtually all banned subjects came to be debated in poetry and expressed in sama. Potentially sacrilegious or blasphemous views bordering on kufr and shirq too could be cast in a majazi mould with haqiqi intent. However, all such enquiry explicitly claimed to subscribe to Allah's grand design and the Islamic, prescriptive, pragmatic form of societal relevance.

Prescriptive ethics of tariqat derived legitimacy for variation with the sharia on the basis of relevance to the social context. Islamic concepts of social integration in a segmental structure had given rise to individual collectivism within Arab tradition while absorbing the individual as part of the tribal community. The sufia inverted the sequence, to develop a collective individualism, which subsumed all spiritual acts across the religious spectrum of the ages. Silsilas thus tolerated humanistic existence in grey areas sometimes even at the expense of the spirit of the law. So long as they provided a pragmatic and culturally acceptable sequence of steps on how to absorb human values of Islam, objectivity was a non-issue for the sufia. The silsilas that emerged thus presented a variety of postulations on 'how to act' and 'what to do' each with its own communal or local cultural bias¹³.

THE SOUTH ASIAN EXPERIENCE:

Two factors worked against an exercise of the entire range of Muslim intellectual activity and enquiry in the Delhi Sultanate. In the first instance a limited¹⁴ quantity and variety of emigrant manpower from the older habitats of the Muslims and in the second the limited scope for conversion in communities steeped in sensual and sensory mythology. Whereas the Buddhist and Jain revolts against Brahman dogma provided islands of population ripe for conversion to Islam; contrary to popular belief, the lower Hindu castes did not swarm to the Muslim camp. The fact that the Muslims remained a minority, except in pockets of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kashmir, Gujrat & Deccan throughout history; is only a superficial indicator. Real proof of the limited appeal of Islam in the lower castes of Bharat is seen in the continued presence of huge numbers of lower caste Hindus found in India today.

If the spirit of anthropological enquiry initiated by al-Biruni¹⁵ failed to take root in Delhi, historical and hikayat literature¹⁶ fared better. If astronomical technology and cartography did not find students in the Doab, certain weapons and tactical instruments were locally developed by the Muslims. If the foray into hadis and sirat by the author of Mashariq¹⁷ was a lone venture, innovation in tariqat found its true element in India. The sultans of Delhi also had, perforce, to find new ways of relating to and absorbing vast non-Muslim subject populations. It is in this arena that we must seek the root and fruit of formation of Muslim tradition of intellectualism in South Asia. This process began when the capital of a Muslim state was first located in Bharat, i.e. Delhi¹⁸. Preceding developments in lands comprising modern Pakistan were in either the Arab or Central Asian Turkish traditions.

The present study focuses on “Formation of Muslim Tradition of Societal Relations in South Asia”, a function¹⁹ of the formation of their intellectual tradition. Intellectualism of the Muslims of South Asia began with the Sultanate of Delhi and was virtually confined to issues of societal relations through two segments of an organic structure. The spiritual governance of ulema and mashaikh led to enquiry in the potential manifestations of belief and faith. Temporal governance of the Salatin on the other hand led to the formulation of innovative policy and practice in a segmental administration of a communally divided state. Here we will address both these governances²⁰ in parallel as two subsections.

SPIRITUAL GOVERNANCE:

In the interest of space we will not give a stage by stage evolution of societal organization in the Sultanate of Delhi. Suffice it to say that Muslim intellectualism did not visualize a state mechanism without a spiritual dimension²¹. In more orthodox structures of Muslim spiritualism [dominated by the ulema] the Sultans were expected to seek guidance from the Ulema but the latter were advised to avoid court life²². Later the Sufia were given the same advice when they became the leading proponents of Muslim spiritualism. This did not, however, deter ulema and sufia from association with the process of governance. The Chishti Silsila, which was most strict in the matter of association with the state, none the less believed in the practice of spiritual politics²³. Spiritual politics claimed, on the one hand, that sufia were able to influence temporal existence [even governance] through karamat, and on the other that they were entitled to determine and lead public opinion in politics. Other silsilas²⁴ and mashaikh took an even more direct interest in the politics of the Muslim state. It was in fact essential for the rulers to gain the support, assistance and participation of the ulema and mashaikh for the smooth functioning of their state²⁵.

Here it is important to emphasize that until relatively recent times, human values in all societies held that righteous religious and spiritual inclination of rulers was essential for their legitimacy. Thus religious leaders were arbiters of spiritual legitimacy of rulers as a general rule; the Delhi Sultanate was no exception. We find, during the time of Iltutmish, that the Sheikh-ul-Islam was one of the leading mashaikh of his times²⁶. However, we also see that these mashaikh were quite as strict in observance of orthodox religion as the ulema²⁷. Iltutmish was reputed to be strictly orthodox in his personal observance of Islam. A major historian and religious scholar of the age, Minhaj-us-Siraj, is an example of how the ulema contributed to the strengthening of state institutions in various fields²⁸. Sheikh Baha-ud-din Zakariya, founder of Suhrawardi Silsila at Multan²⁹, an important political figure in the Delhi Sultanate, was perhaps the most powerful politician in Multan.

Muslims had been in contact with the Hindus of Bharat for three to five centuries prior to the conquest of Delhi. Coastal regions of the Deccan too had a long association with the Arabs as traders, before and after the advent of Islam. Some of these associations had left a favourable impact, others had a negative flavor. Remarkably two of the major religious contributions to Muslim intellectualism in the northern part of modern India came at a time when the Hindu ruling elite was in full command. These were the founding of the Chishtia Silsila at Ajmer under the very nose of Prithviraj³⁰ and the probable compilation of parts of the *Mashariq* in Badaun³¹. The Muslim presence had, however, not disturbed the societal ecology of Bharat prior to the conquest of Delhi. Firstly, the population was insignificant; second, Islam exercised an influence in already marginalized communities of Buddhists and Jains. It posed no threat to the Hindu establishment either in spiritual or temporal terms; as such it was tolerated, perhaps even assisted against traditional spiritual rivals such as the Jains. It is interesting to note that while, at this time, the Chishti ideas were being propagated nearer to Muslim political centers, the hard core of orthodox sharia found a protagonist in areas where no Muslim government had any contacts.

Initially the task of the Muslim community in Delhi and other urban centers was simple. They constituted a more or less culturally homogeneous, if ethnically diverse, community with a reflex tendency toward interdependence³². Even the areas where they settled were rather exclusive during the period of Aibuk's viceroyalty. Certain quarters of the old fort region which had been occupied by the non-Muslims prior to the conquest of Delhi were taken over for the ruling elite under Aibuk. In these urban regions the ulema exercised an unalloyed spiritual hegemony. However, the segregation of communities did not last long and strict observance of orthodoxy as practiced in Khurasan or Balkh and Bukhara was no longer feasible for the common Muslim. As access to the Chishti sufia was not limited to any religious persuasion, they, therefore, flourished in the Hindu dominated Doab³³. The influence of local spiritual ethics and practice is particularly obvious in the doctrines and norms of the Chishtia Silsila. Their attitude toward asceticism and state patronage are areas which display a marked similarity with preceding spiritual traditions of Bharat. The *futuh*³⁴ show Islamized forms of bhikshu and yogi patterns while the *lataif* bore similarity to Buddhi/Shuddhi or Tantaras and the practice of Sama³⁵ was a substitute for Bhajans. So extensive is the inclination toward local practices that the emphasis on the non-written sources and miraculous powers of the Hindus were treated as a competitive counterfoil³⁶. Even if it could be established that Chishti sufia were competing for the same population as the Rishi from the start, it is clear that this inclination increased under the Khaljis due to the unorthodox sociology and statecraft of this meta-Turkish tribal group.

It is possible to see the gradual transition from strict orthodoxy to loosely defined Islamist philosophy as a function of time on the one hand and of the easterly movement of sufia on the other. The Chishti silsila reflects the combined effects of the two variables in the practices of its mashaikh and Khalifas while Suhrawardis depict partiality towards a westerly culture. Though Qutb-ud-din Bakhtyar Kaki declined the title of sheikh-ul-Islam, his successor in the east, Badr-ud-din Ghaznavi, accepted state patronage. In the west, he was succeeded by Baba Farid who, despite being a great ascetic, was very strict in the observance of namaz³⁷. Baba Farid operated in Hansi and Pakpattan, west of the Gangetic doab; perhaps his inability to adjust to mainstream Hindu thought caused him to gravitate more toward the western part of his domain. Toward the east, Sheikh Ala-ud-din, founder of the Sabri silsila probably practiced in the region of Saharanpur and was more inclined to the practice of sama, his teachings are however, known only indirectly³⁸.

The hegemony of the Chishti silsila in the Doab neither came in a single sweep nor did it acquire dominance without any challenges. The Suhrawardi sufia also tried their luck in the Gangetic region as did the Firdausi silsila. While the champion of the former, Jalal-ud-din Tabrizi, may have tried to establish his order in Hansi, Badaun and Delhi before he reconciled himself to the farthest corner of the Sultanate in Lakhnauti; the latter initially challenged the Chishti hegemony in Delhi³⁹ but was finally forced to retreat to Bihar⁴⁰. As the Suhrawardi silsila had established its hegemony over the regions which now form the state of Pakistan; the Chishtia silsila ruled all of Bharat from Rajputana to Bihar; its great names such as Khwaja Moin-ud-din Chishti and Khwaja Bakhtyar Kaki were its founding fathers and Baba Farid proved to be its beacon in the west, at Pakpattan⁴¹.

It was with Hazrat Nizam-ud-din Aulia, however, that the silsila attained unrestricted sway over both Hindu and Muslim communities in the Doab region. Whereas the initial Muslim settlers in Delhi may have had the luxury of not associating with the non-Muslim population in and around the city, the second generation neither had the choice nor perhaps the will to maintain continuous segregation. In the economic field the state mechanism was as keen to minimize segregation as was the society. However, in their social interaction both parties needed arbitration and brokerage. Sheikh Mutawakkil, Maulana Ishaq and Sheikh Sabir⁴² provided the initial procedures for the Chishtia order to underwrite the societal desegregation in the Doab in general and, in particular, for the city of Delhi. A balance had to be provided between the observance of regimented rituals of Muslims and the orchestrated choreographic devotional activity of the Hindus. This is the task that fell to Hazrat Nizam-ud-din Aulia who responded to it with fervor.

Nizam-ud-din Aulia was in the preliminary stages of initiation during the Nasir period. He probably began his rise to the centre of Delhi's spiritual stage in the Balbanid era and attained undisputed dominance under the Khaljis. Perhaps the most important single need of the times was a mechanism for societal brokerage. Apparently Suhrawardi hold over Balban and the Tughluqs was significant enough to limit the Chishti influence before and after the Khalji rule. Barani has recorded that the Hindus used to pass through Delhi and past Jalal-ud-din Khalji's palace chanting ritual prayers. It is likely that encouragement for this free expression of their religion came from the Chishti khanqah where its variant, the Sama was practiced as a Muslim equivalent. However, the Sheikh is also credited with insistence on the non-compulsory prayers for purist Muslim disciples. Compromises and overcompensations of this kind emerged as mechanisms for this societal brokerage.

The Suhrawardi silsila did not aspire to a large non-Muslim following and, therefore, presented a tariqat for neo-converts which was less orthodox than the demands of Ulema. Their lack of emphasis on tariqat is obvious from the fact that, even the son and successor of Hazrat Baha-ud-din Zakariya, Sheikh Sadr-ud-din Arif, deviated from the policies of his sheikh. After Nizam-ud-din Aulia, we begin to see similar deviations among Chishti sufia as well. The Suhrawardis maintained a minimal level of inter-communal discourse to target potential converts or diffuse communal tension. The Chishti silsila on the other hand gave free reign to tariqat as a medium of cross communal dialogue, maximizing its inter-societal relations⁴³ in the process. This phenomenon may be termed an interfaith dialogue in modern parlance; which led to the spiritualistic Bhakti movement in the early fifteenth century and to Ala-ud-din's "secularly motivated" plan to found a new religion.

In the context of the Delhi Sultanate the Suhrawardi silsila was half a generation behind the Chishtia. Having formed its base in older regions of Muslim settlement [Multan and Uch] it continued to focus on conversion. Two scenarios seem equally logical; that, as the Suhrawardis were more interested in conversion of the locals therefore they developed a base where more people were willing to convert to Islam; or that, as the people of the Ganga-Jamna doab were disinclined to convert, the Suhrawardi silsila failed to take root there. The question why the region dominated by the Chishtia Silsila did not become a Muslim majority area, while Suhrawardi silsila was able to develop a Muslim majority is sometimes answered on the basis of demographic flow. The argument presented is that as a result of successive waves of Muslim immigration into the Indus enclave, the region became predominantly Muslim. However, it is difficult to sustain this hypothesis in the light of the Muslim majority in the area that is Bangladesh today; as there was no mass migration of Muslims into that region. The most plausible solution is that the open door policy of Chishtia mashaikh, which did not insist on conversion, provided a disincentive for conversion of Hindus. When this was coupled with societal endorsement of Chishtia tenets by both communities of the region, the net advantage in conversion was minimal. It seems that the Muslim community of Delhi was reconciled to remaining a dominant minority and the Hindus were content to absorb elements of Muslim spiritualism so long as they were not required to make major cultural adjustments.

The Chishtia mashaikh took on practices such as bowing before the murshid, shaving the heads of new entrants etc in imitation of the Hindu and Buddhist practices. Even Khwaja Moin-ud-din, who was far more orthodox than his successors, appears to have chosen local symbolism like sun and earth to express his views⁴⁴. The founder of the Suhrawardi silsila, Hazrat Baha-ud-din Zakariya, was quite intolerant of such practices⁴⁵. Thus the spiritual sphere of the sultanate was divided into the central and peripheral systems. The former was more structured internally but less stringent in its demands from its followers. The latter allowed greater freedom to its initiates and Khalifas but was more demanding in the formalism of religious practices and generally confined to the Muslim community. Whereas a spiritual government of the Gangetic region, with locally relevant innovations continued apace under the Chishti silsila, the temporal governance was conservative, both in the speed of adaptation as well as the areas of innovation. At a societal level, the issues were more within the realm of the common citizen's priorities. The state level, however, was naturally dominated by the elite and, even at the level of the common Muslim was an issue of communal dominance which could not be compromised. The breakthrough again came during the Khalji period but was also in arrears, by nearly a generation [30 years].

TEMPORAL GOVERNANCE:

The Sultans in contrast with the mashaikh were only able to extend their control in small steps. Sometimes losing ground in spatial terms at others in terms of the depth of control. For nearly a century the sultanate failed to make any meaningful additions to the territory conquered during the time of Ghori⁴⁶. By the end of Iltutmish's rule the intermingling of the Hindu and Muslim communities of Delhi had reached a stage where they influenced each other's daily life. Kilukehri, the habitat of Rukn-ud-din Firoz and Kaikubad, home to the Ahl-i-Tarab and Ahl-i-Murad⁴⁷, had apparently become the entertainment centre of Delhi's commoners some time before it was patronized by Sultans⁴⁸. Qalandars too had gained access to the court, though they were probably not popular among common people in the time of Bahram shah. Even the tolerant Minhaj was unable to support Ayyub and Fakhr-ud-din Farrash as companions of the Sultan⁴⁹. During Ilbari rule ulema rather than the mashaikh were the arbiters of conduct and enquiry within the sultanate. Their concern was sharia and fiqh for the Muslim community not priorities of the non-Muslims.

Till the time of Nasir-ud-din the main concern of Sultans too was the Muslim population of the Sultanate. With the first rush of the Mongols, Iltutmish had barely been able to secure his borders and limit immigration to those who were not pursued by Chingiz or his troops. The two way traffic during the reign of their successors created a situation that may not have been visualized either by Chingiz or Iltutmish. When he became sultan, Balban was able to revive immigrations from the west; a process that may possibly even have picked up in Nasir-ud-din's time. Probably the later Ilbaris encouraged conversion to Islam among Mongols. Not only were the Mongol neo-Muslims and Afghans absorbed in the body politic during Balban's time but the Hindu population was brought within the structure of direct governance without involvement of the rajas⁵⁰. Khuts and Muqaddams, who had not been involved in governance east of the region of modern Pakistan so far⁵¹, were empowered by Balban. Providing a state driven mechanism of increasing communal interaction in the Sultanate, he created the conditions necessary for a fillip to discourses of the Chishti Silsila which established its indomitable ascendancy in and around Delhi.

The end of the Ilbari rule coincided approximately with a century [three generations] of Muslim settlement in Delhi⁵². Forces of social change had been very active in the urban regions inhabited by the Muslims but they had not been dormant in the periphery either. In administrative⁵³ matters, non-Muslims urban populations were amalgamated into the sultanate structure and absorbed within the state in economic terms. The contributors to this include the unsung hero, Nasir-ud-din and the much praised Balban; both provided a stability and security which is credited almost exclusively to the latter⁵⁴. The Ilbaris were, however, unable to institute inter-communal relations directly in their government.

The end of the 7th Hijra century saw a revival in Muslim expansionism from the centre at Delhi. Starting with the willy-nilly initiative of the maverick Ala-ud-din, the Deccan was opened and engulfed in a maneuver more gradual and perhaps more effective in the short run than the conquest of the northern part of Bharat. The societal divide of this region is a subject that deserves more study for the purpose of generalizations in the present context. However, it is certain that the communal divide and inter faith relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Deccan suffered from a handicap of a century but benefited from the communal interaction in the north. Thus both parties, the conquering Muslims and the conquered non-Muslims had a fair idea of the conditions they were likely to face.

With the advent of the Khaljis the societal integration spearheaded by Chishtia silsila was able to penetrate a large part of the Doab. This is probably one of the reasons that the area of Khas land was enhanced under Ala-ud-din Khalji⁵⁵. As politico-administrative aspects of governance penetrated deeper, economic regulation was added to taxation, coinage and security as an issue of governance. Ala-ud-din's price regulation is an underemphasized innovation in the annals of statecraft. It may not be the first extensively recorded price control policy in history⁵⁶; but it is certainly original for South Asia. It was necessitated, probably by the extraordinary "minority status" of the Muslims in the Delhi Sultanate⁵⁷ and the concomitant limitations for exploitation of the economic needs. It is worth remembering that Ala-ud-din's management of the Deccan was indirect, essentially under the management of the original ruler who was designated Rai-Rayan.

The fact that Ala-ud-din was conscious of the need for a conceptual adjustment to local conditions can be seen in two other 'events' of his reign. First, his alleged intent to found a religion; the second is his reported conversation with Qazi Mughis⁵⁸. The formation of Muslim intellectualism in spiritual and temporal governance; went hand in hand during the Khalji period. Since this line of reasoning and enquiry placed a serious strain on faith and tested the limits of belief on both fronts; the ulema and their champions, the Tughluq sultans, challenged this trend in the hope of instituting an axial correction. Of course the challenge did not come while the Khaljis still ruled because Tughluq was stationed in the periphery. The consequences of the Khalji policies came in two stages and precipitated a reaction at the end of the second phase. Malik Naib⁵⁹ as a political actor may not appear very different from Imad-ud-din Raihan⁶⁰ or Balban-i-Kishlu Khan but in his societal role he acquires a totally different status because of his ethnicity and political status. However, his activities were not, in themselves, enough to elicit a reaction; they needed the addition of Khusrau Malik's assumption of the throne and insulting behaviour.

That Khusrau Malik is considered a Hindu revivalist may, in part be due to Barani's historiography but he no doubt denotes the high water mark of tolerance of local tradition and community in the Sultanate of Delhi. Muhammad bin Tughluq also entertained local elements in his state management but this seems more a matter of policy than communal tolerance and interaction. Muhammad bin Tughluq was genuinely interested in societal or administrative integration of his subjects but, like his father did not approve of laxity and permissiveness in matters of faith. It is this lack of segmental adjustment, organic vision and pragmatic orientation that led to Muhammad bin Tughluq's failure and it was exactly this segmental organic pragmatism that contributed to Ala-ud-din Khalji's success.

Economic regulations became a common feature of policy in the sultanate⁶¹, paving the way for societal integration. Ala-ud-din had tried to minimize socio-religious distinctions among his subjects but it seems unlikely that he wished to achieve societal integration⁶² within his realm. However, Muhammad bin Tughluq appears to have made a conscious effort to create legal and political integration in his empire. The need of currency control has been known since the dawn of civilization; the Muslims appear to have given it more importance than most state structures as it is a constant subject of historiography. Ghoris coinage bore local symbols and legends⁶³ for more efficient circulation. We see a gradual decline in the use of traditional local images as time progressed. Muhammad bin Tughluq, attempted to reach all his subjects through the issue of token currency. One explanation may be the fact that mass produced standardized issue of these coins was convenient.

Muhammad bin Tughluq's move to shift his capital to the Deccan has been interpreted by Barani as an administrative ploy to control his large empire⁶⁴. Since most of the southern regions were brought directly under imperial control in the same period, this can be partly true. However, it seems that the cultural assimilation of the newly absorbed regions was a priority as well. Muhammad bin Tughluq failed in several projects including the shifting of his capital; perhaps the project that suffered the worst fate was his attempt to integrate his subjects as a community and society. Earlier Sultans had maintained a segmental and split level governance structure in accordance with the conditions within their empire but Muhammad bin Tughluq was not content with neither the Iqta structure or with that of tributary states or the use of Naib-Vazir⁶⁵ as an option of control. Whereas Muhammad bin Tughluq did use the office of the Naib-Vazir, it was not used extensively.

The Ilbaris had used the Abbasid tradition of dividing their empire into Iqtas but initially followed the Ghoriid practice of allowing free reign to the Muqtis⁶⁶. Nasir-ud-din and his successor curtailed the liberty of the Muqti [holder of Iqta] but continued the practice of collecting khiraj or ghanimat from rajas and mawasat [recalcitrant groups within the Sultanate]. The Khaljis retained the Iqta system, formalized the tributary status of the rajas and initiated the practice of leaving a naib-Vazir, much in the tradition of the Shahna, in areas where their control was likely to depend on a mixture of Muqtis, Valis and Rajas. These segments of split control provided considerable flexibility and made it possible to adjust to both inter and intra communal imperatives. Ghias-ud-din Tughluq is perhaps the most balanced and consistent among the Sultans of Delhi. Though he did not approve of Sama and may have had views regarding other administrative procedures but did not institute changes this was left to Muhammad, his successor.

DUAL GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH ASIA:

Formation of Muslim Intellectualism for societal relations in the Sultanate of Delhi led to a dual governance as outlined above. The inherent parallel duality of governance is a phenomenon of Muslim organic pragmatic segmentalism and may be found in virtually all Muslim states and societies. That it placed the Mashaikh at the helm of affairs in Delhi too is not unique to South Asia or the Sultanate. We may come across similar conditions in Central Asia and Iran as well, again in consonance with local conditions and traditions. What is unique is the fact that in this dual control, both partners were reconciled to the minority status of the Muslim community and to the accommodation of the non-Muslims in a communal integration. This kind of 'secularization' of religion was achieved through an anomalous structure of overcompensation and under-emphasis by the Chishti silsila.

Another feature that was extraordinary in the Delhi Sultanate was the fact that segmental division did not end with bifurcation into the organs of spiritual and temporal state but it penetrated each segment and bifurcated or trifurcated control in each segment. Spiritually the overlapping societal units included the Ulema and the Mashaikh, the mashaikh were divided among silsilas and recluse or mendicant orders *with area specific and community specific territoriality*. Thus, in a sense the Muslim spiritualistic community reflected the socio-cultural and religio-political fractures within the locals of the Delhi Sultanate. The government too was fragmented into Khas lands, Iqta, Iqlim and Vilayet on the one hand and Khuts, Muqaddams and Rajas, occasionally having a settled tribute or a Naib-Vazir and Amiran Sadah to collect revenues. This fragmented and organic arrangement too was disturbed by Muhammad bin Tughluq and produced disastrous results.

The state which was not distinct from the government under the sultans and the ulema as its spiritual guardians encompassed the society from the outside as it were and mashaikh bound it from the inside in packages determined by economic or socio-religious integrity. This tradition of divided and dual governance with its multiple layers continues to be the basis for modern societal politics of the Muslim communities of South Asia. Mashaikh, Ulema and other spiritual leaders continue to bind the society from the inside, dominate political value systems and generally retain command of what has been termed “spiritual politics” above. People do not generally approve of their presence in corridors of power as such but look to them as power brokers; interceding on behalf of temporal authority or those affected by it. As arbiters of value systems and custodians of spiritual power, ulema, mashaikh, Qalandars, sufis and pirs have an unchallenged right with segmental authority, each over his own murids and tariqas, sometimes exercising control severally.

¹ The dismemberment of the state that was Pakistan in 1970 is a source of regret to Pakistanis today. I wish that I had been able to come to East Pakistan but I am gratified to see that there is much brotherly affection for us in Bangladesh even today. The scars and rancor of the partition of British India are much deeper in Pakistan than are the marks of 1971; perhaps this is also true of Bangladesh.

² The Sultanate of Delhi, a term which applies to a thirteenth and fourteenth century state centered at Delhi, is variously identified in terms of inception and demise. In my research I have identified it with the date on which the investiture was granted to Sultan Iltutmish. Its distinctive feature that marks it apart from those states of the Arabs and Turks which centered in Baghdad, Ghaznin and Multan etc is that the Muslims had to reconcile themselves to being a minority as rulers. The process whereby this state emerged due to the statecraft of the Ghoris has been discussed in Khurram Qadir, “Implications of the Distinctive Features of the Ghori Chain of Command”, *Pakistan Journal of History & Culture*, Vol. XXII, No. 1, pp.1-15.

³ A case in point is the difference between the terms Ilm and Science. Science draws a distinction between theory and practice and differentiates between knowledge and belief. Ilm on the other hand does not insist on a distinction between theory and practice and aspires to integrate knowledge and belief.

⁴ The term societal has been preferred over social to give a segmental nuance to the discourse in preference to an analytical one. The essential difference being emphasized here is the notion that social is exclusive of political, cultural and historical elements not in its factual content but in its theoretical construct. Societal on the other hand purports to society as a segment of humanity inclusive of its cultural, political, historical and anthropological components.

⁵ Turkish Triangles are amazing innovations in zones of transition [a segmental mechanism of transforming a square or octagonal base into a circular dome]. The basic concept is that triangles may be arranged in a group to provide flat surfaces at one end and curved ones at the other [by making segments of a cone], a technique which has been used in a variety of permutations by the Turks. The most fascinating use of these may be found in modern Turkey. See Oktay Aslanapa, *Turkish Art and Architecture*, London, 1971.

⁶ Imam Ghazali’s ability to span the entire range of the societal experience may be estimated from the fact that he was equally erudite in the knowledge of the ulema, a formalized orthodoxy; the mashaikh, a psycho-social amorphous unorthodox variety of spiritualism; and the wisdom of the statesmen. The *Kitab-ul-Ilm of Ihya Ulum-ud-din*, tr. Nabi Amin Faris, Lahore, 1962 spanned the spiritual spectrum while the *Nasihah-ul-Muluk*, tr. F. R. C Bagley, London, 1962; competes with Al-Mawardi’s *Al-Ahkam-us-Sultaniya*, tr. Maulvi Syed Muhammad Ibrahim, Lahore, ND and Tusi’s *Siyasat Nama*, tr. Herbert Darke, London, 1960. Ghazali thus set the stage and fixed the parameters for societal relations in the Sultanates just as Mahmud Ghaznavi and Sanjar Seljuqi set the standards for subsequent Salatin.

⁷ Whereas the organic, pragmatic and segmental qualities of Muslim epistemology is visible in the societal formulations, the best physical examples of how segmentalism worked can be seen in Muslim contributions to art and architecture. The elevation of Muslim architecture depicts the simultaneous use of horizontal and vertical segmentalism as too does the inner space management of buildings and courtyards or walls and ceiling. For some examples during the Sultanate and Mughal periods of Muslim rule see, R. Nath, *History of Sultanate Architecture*, New Delhi, 1978, Nath *Architecture of Fatehpur Sikri*, Jaipur, 1988; and Percy Brown, *Indian Architecture (The Islamic Period)*, 3rd ed., Bombay, N.D.

⁸ The term enquiry implies, like *Ilm*, a segmental organic study which aspires to integrate the psychological and spiritual aspects of human existence with the physical beings and their tangible environment.

⁹ The concept of Tariqat is central to the Sufi silsilas in general, allowing the murshid considerable liberty in prescriptions for guidance of the murid. However the Chishtia sufis exercised it so freely that the Tariqat could vary from murid to murid. For examples of their practices see Hasan Sijzi, *Fawaid-ul-Fwad*, Urdu tr., Khwaja Hasan Sani Nizami Dehlvi, Lahore, 1991, and Rajkumar Hardev, *Nizami Bansi*, Urdu tr., Khwaja Hasan Nizami, Islamabad, 2000.

¹⁰ The term analysis is used here deliberately in preference to survey to emphasize that this segment of the paper is based on modern epistemology rather than that under which the tradition under study had emerged.

¹¹ Muslim thinkers had been exposed to Greek philosophy during the early Khilafat as well but they faced the full force of it probably in the time of the Abbasids. The Mutazilla were a group of thinkers who, for a time manned the bastion of response to the philosophical issues raised by Christians and Jews as well as free thinkers under Greek influence. In due course of time, however, they succumbed to speculation which led them to questions such as the origin of qualities of *khair* and *shar*, the division of the Godhead under the names of Allah and the created-ness of the Quran. Their debates began to border on sacrilege, discussions became blasphemous and, what was worse, a tendency of dogma and doctrinarism began to emerge in them as a group. For the Mutazilla see Z. H. Jarullah, *Tarikh Mutazilla*, tr. Urdu, R. A. Jafery, Karachi, 1969.

¹² The two major contenders among the *sufia* at this time were the Chishtia and Suhrawardi silsilas. The former started its operations under Sheikh Moin-ud-din at Ajmer and one branch continued in the Rajasthan region. Another branch remained active in the region between Multan and Delhi [Pakpattan and Hansi etc.] while the third and most active branch was located at the capital city of Delhi. Khaliq Ahmed Nizami, *Some Aspects of Religion and Politics in India during the Thirteenth Century*, Aligarh, 1961, p.358f, gives the chronology of succession among the *sufia* of both silsilas.

¹³ *Ibid*, p. 174, gives as many as 14 Silsilas that were active in the Sultanate of Delhi [originally mentioned in the *Ain-i-Akbari*], but he only attaches importance to the Chishti and Suhrawardi silsilas.

¹⁴ The eastward expansion of Islam owed its rate and range of progress to natural geo-strategic factors in the expansionist paradigm of states. The constant eastward shift was engineered by the fragmentation of the Khilafat as much as it was driven by the ambitions of empire builders. Mahmud's centre at Ghaznin did not push much further to the east than Lahore because of the balancing weights to the north and west in Central Asia and Khurasan. In contrast, Ghori's inability to push to the west because of subservience to his brother first led him to misadventure in Gujrat, perhaps because he wished to avoid conflict with the Ghaznavids in Lahore, and then through Multan and Lahore to the Doab region. For details of Ghori's career see Minhaj-us-Siraj, *Tabqaat-i-Nasiri*, Urdu, tr. Ghulam Rasul Mehr, Lahore, 1975.

Prior to the Ghori expansionism, the process of Muslim settlement in the regions of Bharat had been slow. The conquests of Ghori brought a relatively larger number of Turk, Tajik and Afghan settlers to Gangetic regions but the flow was neither one sided nor constant till the period of Iltutmish's successors. Mongol inroads into central Asia and Afghanistan gave a sudden impetus to Muslim settlements in the Sultanate of Delhi but even this was not enough to make them a majority east of the Indus region.

¹⁵ Abu Raihan al-Biruni in his famous *Tahqiq ma li'l Hind*, the first anthropological study in history, presented a socio-cultural profile of contemporary India [tr. E. Sachau, London, 1888]. Unfortunately neither Turks nor Tajiks who subsequently inhabited the region were able to develop on his erudition.

¹⁶ It is virtually impossible to think of a Muslim state or society, especially from Abbasid times onward, in which historical records are not available. From this stand point, the Delhi Sultanate presents rather meager contributions to this genre. Starting with Fakhr-i-Mudabbir, *Tarikh-i-Fakhr-ud-din Mubarakshah*, London, 1927, and *Taj -ul-Maasir*, of Hasan Nizami, on the side of history and *Jawami-ul-Hikayat*, by Muhammad Awfi in hikayat literature, there are only a handful of books to rely on.

¹⁷ Nizami, *Op. Cit.*

¹⁸ The town of Delhi was the capital of Prithviraj's brother, an important member of his confederacy but not a major principality. See, Peter Jackson, "Delhi: The problem of a vast Military Encampment" in, R. E. Frykenberg, *Delhi Through the Ages: Essays in Urban History, Culture and Society*, Delhi, 1986. Like Lahore, it acquired pre-eminence after its conquest by the Muslims. Lahore, Ghaznin and Multan, earlier Muslim centers to the west of Delhi, had Buddhist majority populations at the time of their conquest and, perhaps consequently, did not take as long as the Gangetic region for significant Muslim populations to emerge in their hinterland. The essential difference between the Muslim states centered at Ghaznin and

Lahore with the one that emerged at Delhi is evident from the respective trajectories of growth and historic experience of these states. However that debate is not germane here.

¹⁹ Other areas of intellectualism, viz. art, architecture, literature and poetry were mainly adjunct activities related to the subjects under review here.

²⁰ That the Sufia were claimants of governance is apparent from the fact that they took on most of the titles of power used for Muslim governance. Starting with the subordination of the title of Khalifa by ascribing it to the Khalifa of the sheikh in place of Khalifa of Allah or Muhammad [SAW], the words Shah, Khwaja, and Sultan were only one side of the coin while terms like vilayet etc. provided the concept of domain and estate etc. The munazira and karamat provided the third dimension – that of contest for supremacy/power.

²¹ This is a concept that has often been expressed in the proverbial absence of distinction between religion and politics in Islam. Perhaps it is more accurate to state it as integration between the spiritual and temporal aspects of societal relations as we have done here.

²² See Fakhr Mudabbir, *Op. Cit.* p. 11.

²³ Riazul Islam, *Sufism in South Asia*, Karachi, 2003, p.99, makes an important distinction, albeit apologetic in nature; that the disciples of the Chishti sheikhs were not required to avoid court life. Numerous examples of principle disciples having considerable influence in court show that Riazul Islam is right in asserting that the mashaikh did not undervalue the temporal state and government of the Salatin.

²⁴ The Suhrawardi Silsila in fact believed in direct participation in the communication between the public and the ruling elite. Typical of Turkish Muslim pragmatism, this did not mean that they were part of the state mechanism. In a complex organic structure they too constituted the spiritual counterfoil to temporal governance in the segmental system of societal management. See Riazul Islam, *Op. cit.*, passim.

²⁵ This is an important factor in assuming that the Muslim state was a theocracy. In one important sense the Muslim state was very much a theocracy, no more and no less; because it acknowledged that sovereignty and authority was the domain of Allah alone and without any sharer. In another sense it was not theocratic but religio-centric; the arbiter of public and private morality was the domain of religion and the conduct of state was to be governed by the value system of Islam. But in the matter of the involvement of ulema and sufia in the political system, it was neither religio-centric nor theocratic; this was entirely a socio-political phenomenon and, vis-à-vis the Delhi Sultanate, was predominantly segmental in its construct.

²⁶ Nizami, *Op. Cit.*, p.189, Iltutmish is said to have offered the post of Sheikh-ul-Islam to Bakhtyar Kaki and on his refusal it was given to Sheikh Najm-ud-din Sughra. However, p. 159 [fn.] records that the title was conferred on Hazrat Baha-ud-din Zakariya. Perhaps the title was offered to both and, while the Chishti declined the Suhrawardi accepted it. However, Nizami goes on to note that Bakhtyar Kaki ‘extended his moral support ... in construction of public works.’ We may also note that Bakhtyar Kaki is referred to as Sheikh-ul-Islam by Amir Khurd, *Siyar-ul-Auliya*, tr. Ejaz-ul-Haq Quddusi, Lahore, 1980, perhaps for him it was an honorific bestowed by the comity of mashaikh not by temporal government, and therefore accepted.

²⁷ For the close relations between Iltutmish and Qutb-ud-din Bakhtyar Kaki see Muhammad Aziz Ahmed, *Early Turkish Empire of Delhi*, Lahore, 1949, and for the details of Bakhtyar Kaki’s beliefs and practices refer to Amir Khurd, *Siyar-ul-Auliya*, tr. Ejaz-ul-Haq Quddusi, Lahore, 1980, p. 60ff.

²⁸ See *Tabqaat-i-Nasiri*, for examples of Minhaj’s involvement in war, diplomacy, preaching, judiciary and other activities of the state through a long career of half a century or so.

²⁹ Hazrat Baha-ud-din Zakariya interceded on behalf of the people of Multan in the time of Iltutmish, see, Aziz Ahmed, *Op. Cit.*, p. 89.

³⁰ Prithviraj was a great ruler of Ajmer contemporary with Ghori. He led a confederacy of several Hindu rajas at Tarain, defeating Ghori in the first battle and losing to him in the second a year later, see Minhaj, *op. cit.*, p.711. For Khwaja Moin-ud-din Chishti see Amir Khurd, p.129 and note for reference to the debate on whether he had settled in Ajmer before the battle of Tarain.

³¹ Nizami, *Op. Cit.*, p. 152ff tells us that Badaun was the birth place of Maulana Razi-ud-din Hasan, author of a work on Hadis called *Mashariq-ul-Anwar*. He was also a teacher of Hadis in Nagor and other parts of the Delhi sultanate. He was also sent on a mission by the Khalifa to negotiate the investiture for Iltutmish.

³² Sunil Kumar, *Emergence of the Delhi Sultanate*, New Delhi, 2007, p.195ff while mentioning the ethnic diversity of the Delhi Sultanate in passing mainly focuses on the relative share of Turks in the ethnic pie.

³³ Nizami, *Op. Cit.*, p.175 says that by about 1350, there were some 2000 Khanqahs in the Delhi Sultanate perhaps a majority of them belonged to the Chishti silsila which did not make too much of an issue even on the act of apostasy on the part of a local convert [Nizami, p.179].

- ³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.178f. For a more extensive comment on “the Futuh system in South Asia” see a rather lengthy chapter on the subject in Riazul Islam, *Sufism in South Asia*, Oxford, 2003, pp. 87-151.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, p.189f, is of the opinion that the practice of Sama was popular even in the times of Bakhtyar Kaki. He goes on to suggest that a couplet ultimately led to the death of the Qutb, the couplet it seems was rather suggestive of the concept of transmigration of souls and the cycle of rebirth. This may be true of Bakhtyar Kaki; it is also typical of the kind of spiritual space exploited by sufis in the name of Haqiqi and Majazi.
- ³⁶ Amir Khurd, *Op. Cit.*, p.299f remarks the absence of the use of texts by sufis. Use of the poetic medium also facilitated the oral tradition of the sufis as a counterfoil to verbal Hindu religious communication.
- ³⁷ Amir Hasan Ala Sanjari, *Fawa'id-ul-Fwad*, Urdu tr., Hasan Nizami Sani, Lahore, 1991, p. 379f quotes an incident when throngs of people gathered to meet the sheikh when he moved out to attend congregational prayers. Maulana Badr-ud-din Ishaq, a son in law of Baba Farid lived in the Juma Masjid of Ajodhan and taught the Quran to children. See Nizami, *Op. Cit.*, p. 194.
- ³⁸ *Ibid*, p. 195 informs us that the teachings of this sheikh are known mostly from sources of 17th century onward and that the silsila gained influence from about the beginning of the 15th century.
- ³⁹ So pervasive was the Chishti influence that many scholars only consider the contributions of that silsila while discussing Sufism in the Delhi Sultanate. See as an example, Peter Heehs, ed., *Indian Religions, The Spiritual Traditions of South Asia*, New Delhi, 2003, p.259ff. So dominant is the personality of Nizam-ud-din Aulia that he is the main person dealt with in that section. For a more extensive treatment of the silsila see Khaliq Ahmed Nizami's Urdu work entitled *Tarikh Mashaikh-i-Chisht*, Delhi, 1953 or S. M. Ikram's *Kausar* trilogy for most of the Sufia in India. A source for comparison of the image of the silsilas at the end of the Great Mughals is Dara Shikoh, *Safina-ul-Aulia* Urdu tr. Muhammad Ali Lutfi, Karachi, 1959.
- ⁴⁰ Nizami, *Op. Cit.*, p.177.
- ⁴¹ The *Fawa'id-ul-Fwad*, p.367f says that the territory between Pakpattan and Multan was divided between Baba Farid and Sheikh Baha-ud-din Zakariya. Perhaps at a later date Hansi was a point on the dividing line between the Suhrawardi and Chishti Silsilas.
- ⁴² Nizami, *Op. Cit.*, p. 194ff.
- ⁴³ To a certain extent this difference may be seen in Riazul Islam, *Sufism in South Asia*, Karachi, 2003, p.355 ff. the discourse on the relations between pir and murid. For a fuller understanding it would become necessary to go to original sources of the sufia. In the case of the Chishtia silsila, the *Fawa'id-ul-Fwad*, *Op. Cit.* and Amir Khurd, *Siyar-ul-Auliya*, tr. Ejaz-ul-Haq Quddusi, Lahore, 1980 may be consulted. Suhrawardi mashaikh do not seem to have left such extensive accounts of this kind but Nur Ahmed Khan Faridi has compiled a *Tazkira* in Urdu on *Shah Rukn-i-Alam Multani*, Multan, 1381H. which provides a counterfoil for the understanding of the Suhrawardi attitude.
- ⁴⁴ See *Siyar-ul-Auliya*, p. 46.
- ⁴⁵ Maulana Fazl-Ullah, *Siyar-ul-Arifin*, Urdu tr., Ghulam Ahmed, Moradabad, 1319 H. p. 123.
- ⁴⁶ Ghorī himself made only three forays into the Doab region but his subordinates expanded eastward into the Lakhnauti/Bengal region. The furthest extremity being conquered by Bakhtyar Khalji, the subordinate of a subordinate of Aibuk; a man who had been refused enrollment by the Ariz [muster master] in Ghaznin and Delhi before being patronized through the good offices of a relative. See Minhaj, *Op. Cit.*, p.764. Iltutmish had to re-conquer much of the region after gaining control of Delhi and neither Nasir-ud-din nor Balban were able to increase the area of control. However, Iltutmish himself enhanced the degree of governance exercised by the Sultan over the Muqtis, and issue that continued to haunt Nasir-ud-din. The latter managed to reestablish control over the umra but it was left to Balban to add new dimensions to the relations of the sultanate with its huge non-Muslim majority.
- ⁴⁷ These terms may be translated as ‘people of pleasure’ and ‘people who fulfilled wishes’.
- ⁴⁸ Kilegehri is mentioned as a royal residence by Minhaj, *Op. cit.*, on p.806 and later as Shehr nau. Its status as the abode of the ahl-i-tarab had become established before that is why Rukn-ud-din chose to settle there.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid*, p. 817-824.
- ⁵⁰ Zia-ud-din Barani, *Tarikh-i-Firozshahi*, tr. S. Moin-ul-Haq, Lahore, 1969, p. 107ff, gives the reasons for Balban's failure to conquer more territory and the basic reason was the need for consolidation.
- ⁵¹ The term Khut is found in *Tarikh Fakhr-ud-din Mubarakshah*, *Op. Cit.*, but is missing from Minhaj's discourse altogether; however it reemerges in Barani's work. It seems reasonable to assume that the contact of the rulers with this class had ceased in the period of Iltutmish's family but had revived by Balban's time.
- ⁵² Muslim historians use the term qarn for both segmental classifications: a century as well as a generation. See Minhaj, *Op. Cit.* The term is the root of the word chronology, it signifies large segments of time as well

as time itself. The fact that Muslims had been ruling settlers in Delhi all this time means that there would now be few locals who would have consciously known a time when the Muslims were not rulers at Delhi and many immigrant Muslims would not have any knowledge, let alone a memory, of the area from which their elders had migrated. Naturally this would lead to considerable societal interaction if not integration.

⁵³ For one reconstruction of the Sultanate administration: I. H. Qureshi, *The Administration of the Sultanate of Delhi*, 2nd ed., Lahore, 1944. This is however a general statement and does not give enough emphasis to the Ilbari period. On the other hand Muhammad Aziz Ahmed, *Early Turkish Empire of Delhi*, Lahore, 1949 deals only with the Ilbari period but does not address administrative issues. Perhaps the best secondary source for this subject is A.B.M. Habibullah, *The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India*, Allahabad, 1961.

⁵⁴ An article redressing the balance between the historical roles of Nasir-ud-din and Balban, by the present author, is due to appear in the near future in *Journal of Pakistan Historical Society*.

⁵⁵ K. S. Lal, *History of the Khaljis*, Allahabad, 1950, p.242f is of the view that the reason for the reversion of land grants into Khas was for the purpose of reducing the hold of the umera on state affairs. This was, however, possible because absorption of the local population within the political system took place earlier.

⁵⁶ Since Barani has not claimed it as such, there is reason to doubt this but the variety of issues included in the “policy” suggests that this was an unprecedented measure. See Barani, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 414-461 & passim.

⁵⁷ Peter Jackson, *The Delhi Sultanate: A Political and Military History*, Cambridge, 1999, 156f, highlights the implication of the price control for conquests and on p.279, he highlights the role of these reforms in harnessing the resources available with wealthy Hindus. But the real, though indirect expression of Ala-ud-din’s genius in organic societal management comes when Jackson places “the military, the economy and administrative reforms” in a single chapter, p.238-254. This indicates the integrated nature of the measures and the organic treatment of socio-political issues in the Delhi Sultanate.

⁵⁸ See Barani, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 414-461, passim. While we may infer that the new religion would, like the Din-i-Ilahi of Akbar, have been an amalgam of local faiths with the tenets of Islam and may have encouraged thought processes leading to the Bhakti movement, no such effort is required for the conversation with Qazi Mughis. In the latter incident, Barani clearly reports that Ala-ud-din said that he was willing to set aside the dictates of Sharia for exigencies of state.

⁵⁹ Peter Jackson, *Op. Cit.*, p.200ff, for a survey of the military exploits in the Deccan and Barani, *Op. Cit.*, p. 530ff for his role in the last days of Ala-ud-din and after the death of the Sultan.

⁶⁰ Although A.B.M. Habibullah, *The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India*, Allahabad, 1961, has a very balanced and sensitive grasp on the subject, he has dealt with the period of Iltutmish’s family in two chapters of which one presents the ‘Dynastic Troubles’ and the other is related to ‘Hindu Aggression’. As such he has ignored both the Mongol factor and the stability provided by Nasir-ud-din through his delicate management of political miscreants. The characters of the Nasiri period mentioned here have been assessed by various authors the assessment of the present author may be sought in the article on Nasir-ud-din that has been mentioned supra.

⁶¹ Ala-ud-din’s reforms were followed by policy restructuring under Ghias-ud-din’s administration which aspired to be solid rather than brilliant. See Barani, *Op. cit.*, pp.614-619, then came the grandiloquent age of Muhammad bin Tughluq whose successes and failures were equally brilliant and monumental.

⁶² K. S. Lal, *History of the Khaljis*, Allahabad, 1950, p. 311, may have presented the most sympathetic view of Ala-ud-din and an estimate of his aspirations but he does not mention a desire to integrate his subjects.

⁶³ H. Nelson Wright, *The Coinage and Metrology of the Sultans of Dehli*, New Delhi, 1974, pp.6-66, even the gold coins of Ghoris bear Hindi on the reverse but only silver and Billon coins of Iltutmish have Hindi script on them. Thereafter, virtually all the Ilbaris only use Hindi on billon coinage but it is possible that Mubarak Khalji did not use Hindi even on billon.

⁶⁴ Among his other measures may be enumerated his plan to restructure the administrative divisions. In the Deccan this took the form of the Shiqq system while Habiba Khatun, *Iqlim Sonargaon*, Dhaka, 2006, p.23, believes that in Bengal it took the form of reallocation of duties and district boundaries.

⁶⁵ The Khaljis adopted this practice in the Deccan, See Barani, *Tarikh-i-Firozshahi*, Urdu tr. Moin-ul-Haq, Lahore, 1969, p.563, for the appointment of Yaklakhi to that region under Mubarak Khalji.

⁶⁶ For a discussion on Iqta, Muqti and Iqtadar, see I. H. Siddiqui, *Authority and Kingship under the Sultans of Delhi*, New Delhi, 2006, p. 49.